Q&R Connaissances Trading Crypto, Portefeuille & Blockchain
Q&R courantes couvrant le trading de cryptomonnaies, les portefeuilles et les connaissances blockchain, incluant des explications et un contenu de réponse associés.
- 01
Les chaînes de 26 transactions non confirmées sont-elles interdites par le portefeuille dans Bitcoin Core 31.0 ?
Vous pouvez avoir une chaîne de plus de 25 transactions non confirmées dans le pool mémoire, mais le portefeuille impose toujours une limite de chaîne de 25 transactions. En exécut...
Technologie - 02
What does it mean that the security of Bitcoin public keys and 256-bit ECDSA is 128 bits?
What does it mean that the security of 256-bit ECDSA, and therefore Bitcoin keys, is 128 bits? I mean, if I have approximately 2^256 possible points on the elliptic curve (thus pos...
Sécurité et risques - 03
Receiving donation on a bitcoin address and security issues of reusing the same address
For a blog that only receives occasional small amounts you probably shouldn't worry too much about it. However, if you plan to scale up, here are some things to consider: One issu...
Sécurité et risques - 04
How can vulnerabilites in bitcoin be responsibly reported?
Information on current (ie, not past/public/resolved) security issues should be sent to the private [email protected] mailing list. The SourceForge list is now...
Sécurité et risques - 05
Is 24 words seed safer than 12 words in terms of bruteforcing the private key
Regardless of whether you have a passphrase or not 12 words is just as secure as 24 words because the resulting public key will still require 2^128 iterations to compute its privat...
Sécurité et risques - 06
Brassard-Høyer-Tapp (BHT) Algorithm and Bitcoin (BIP360)
Grover's is related and some considerations were discussed here on Stackexchange, too. We could design a black box function to break both P2PKH and P2SH (and P2WSH, etc.) addresse...
Sécurité et risques - 07
How do you derive the private key from two signatures that share the same k value?
ECDSA signatures are pairs (r,s) where r=(k*G).x mod n, and s = (m + r*x)/k mod n, where x is the secret key, k is the random nonce, and m is the message. If you have two s values...
Sécurité et risques